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Strategic Insight 
Homeland Defense: Ramping Up, But What's the Glide Path? 
by James Russell and Iliana Bravo 
Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The 
CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 
Government. 
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Background 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 have brought about massive increases in spending for homeland 
security and have established defense of the homeland as a primary responsibility of the Defense 
Department. DoD's most recent Quadrennial Defense Review clearly states that defense of the 
continental United States has become a top priority for the military: "The highest priority of the United 
States military is to defend the nation from all enemies. The United States will maintain sufficient military 
forces to protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory and its critical defense-related infrastructure 
against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders as appropriate under U.S. law."1 
The Defense Department launched OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE - the direct defense of the continental 
United States - in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The operation consisted initially 
of NORAD assuming control over active forces with air and anti-air capabilities to ensure the security of 
U.S. airspace. After the attack, DoD moved aggressively to enhance civilian and government site security 
using reserve and active forces. The most visible of these forces have been the 7200 National Guard 
troops augmenting security at 444 airports around the country. The United States also requested and 
received assistance from NATO partners under article 5 of the NATO treaty, freeing up U.S. E-3 Airborne 
Warning and Control System aircraft to support OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, the offensive 
operations against Al Qaeda in the Afghan theater.  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers told Congress in early February that DoD is 
in the midst of modifying the Unified Command Plan to establish a combatant command for homeland 
security.2 Likely to be called NORCOM, or the Northern Command, details are still being worked out over 
the nature and structure of the command. 
The Budget 
The Bush Administration's Budget for 2003 - the Federal government's first post-September 11 budget - 
reflects the emphasis now accorded to achieving a more secure homeland. The FY 2003 Budget directs 
$37.7 billion to homeland security, up from $19.5 billion in 2002. The budget supports four functional 
areas: supporting first responders to a terrorist attack; defending against bioterrorism; securing America's 
borders; and using 21st century technology to secure the homeland. 
Of interest to the naval community, the FY 2003 Budget increases funding for the Coast Guard's 
homeland security related missions (protecting ports and coastal areas, as well as interdiction activities) 
by $282 million, to an overall level of $2.9 billion. After September 11, the Coast Guard's port security 
mission grew from approximately 1-2 percent of daily operations to between 50-60 percent today. In 
addition, the Coast Guard will continue to pursue missions that existed before September 11, such as 
illegal immigration and drug interdiction and maritime safety. 
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The FY 2003 budget requests $7.8 billion for homeland security-related activities of the Department of 
Defense and Intelligence Community. The largest portion of the total request ($4.6 billion) is dedicated to 
the physical security of Department of Defense facilities and personnel inside the United States, while the 
second largest is for maintaining combat air patrols within U.S. airspace ($1.3 billion). The FY 2003 
budget also requests significant funding for research and development related to combating terrorism, as 
well as for several specialized response teams such as the National Guard's Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Civil Support Teams. 
Navy Issues  
Like the other military departments, it is uncertain what role the Navy will play in this mission, though 
naval aircraft and surface combatants have capabilities that could be applied in securing airspace and 
maritime borders. 
As a primary economic resource, U.S. ports are the most vulnerable to terrorist attacks and often, the 
least protected of all U.S. entry points. Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for protecting more 
than 360 of these ports and 95,000 miles of U.S. coastline.3 It is the lead agency for maritime homeland 
security. The Coast Guard has recently joined forces with the U.S. Navy to improve efforts to protect our 
coastlines from potential threats. 
Following the September 11th attacks, the Atlantic components of the Navy and Coast Guard announced 
the assignment of six Cyclone-Class Navy Patrol Coastal (PC) ships to support OPERATION NOBLE 
EAGLE.4 Four of these PCs will be assigned to the Atlantic Coast, and two to the Pacific Coast. It is the 
first time U.S. Navy ships have been used to support the maritime protection efforts of the Coast Guard. 
The ships will be used for coastal patrol, interdiction efforts, and providing anti-terrorism/force protection 
for naval ships. The PCs will also be used to escort commercial vessels in and out of U.S. ports. The 
Atlantic Fleet PCs will be under tactical control of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area Command, while 
operational control will lie with the Atlantic Fleet Navy commands. 
Normally, U.S. Navy personnel are prohibited from participating in law enforcement activities 
characteristic of the Coast Guard. Under the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, the U.S. military is forbidden 
to search, seize, or arrest people in the United States. The Coast Guard, however, is exempt from this 
law. Therefore, Coast Guard personnel aboard these Navy ships will be allowed to board incoming 
vessels in order to enforce U.S. law. This type of arrangement has existed in the past when Coast Guard 
detachments have deployed aboard U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia for purposes 
of port security and maritime interdiction operations.5 
Having this type of joint force cooperation for maritime security comes at a time when maritime threats to 
the United States are prevalent. Experts monitoring 23 ships considered to be part of the al-Qaeda 
network tagged for transporting heroine and hashish from Afghanistan to the West, say that these vessels 
could provide the most effective way of entering a weapon of mass destruction into the U.S. Without 
having to declare what is in your cargo until you reach your port of entry, a container from one of these 
vessels could easily make its way into the continental United States. Often these containers make their 
way onto U.S. railways, on their way to their port of entry. Therefore, a container coming into California's 
Long Beach Harbor could be in Chicago before its contents were known. Since September 11th, ships 
are required to give 96 hours notice prior to their arrival. This gives maritime security enough time to 
prepare for the inspection of incoming ships, and the ability to interdict these ships at a further distance 
from the homeland than the standard three miles. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Homeland Security & Terrorism Resources. 
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